Abstract. It is the exception that provers share and trust each others proofs. One reason for this is that different provers structure their proof evidence in remarkably different ways, including, for example, proof scripts, resolution refutations, tableaux, Herbrand expansions, natural deductions, etc. In this paper, we propose an approach to foundational proof certificates as a means of flexibly presenting proof evidence so that a relatively simple and universal proof checker can check that a certificate does, indeed, elaborate to a formal proof. While we shall limit ourselves to first-order logic in this paper, we shall not limit ourselves in many other ways. We will describe a certificate format and an architecture for checking that not only works with classical and intuitionistic logics but also with proof structures as diverse as resolution refutations, matings, and natural deduction.
Introduction
Consider a world where the multitude of computation logic systems-theorem provers, model checkers, type systems, static analyzers, etc.-can communicate proofs of theorems between each other. One approach to constructing this kind of world involves (1) inventing a document format in which proof evidence and the semantics of that evidence can be placed and (2) building trusted checkers for those documents. By the term proof certificate we shall mean documents that contain the evidence of proof generated by a theorem prover. The format and semantics for such proof evidence will be given by formal definitions of such certificates. In this paper, we shall propose a framework for describing the semantics of a wide range of proof evidence using proof theoretic concepts. As a result, we shall refer to this approach to defining certificates as "foundational" since it is based not on the technology used to construct a specific theorem prover but rather on basic insights into the nature of proofs provided by the modern literature of proof theory.
The key concept that we take from proof theory is that of focused proof systems [1, 12, 13] . Such proof systems exist for classical, intuitionistic, and linear logics and they are composed of alternating asynchronous and synchronous phases. These two phases allow for a natural interaction to be set up between a process that is attempting to build a proof (the checker) and the information contained in a certificate. During the asynchronous phase of proof construction, the checker proceeds without reference to the actual certificate since this phase consists of invertible inference rules. During the synchronous phase, information from the certificate can be extracted to guide the construction of the focused proof. The definition of a proof certificate format essentially boils down to defining the details of this interaction.
The main structure for our framework contains the following components.
-The kernel of our checker is a logic program specification of the focusing framework LKU proof system [13] . Since this implementation of LKU is highlevel and direct, we can have a high degree of confidence that the program does, in fact, capture the LKU proof system. -By restricting various structural rules, LKU can be made into a focused proof system for classical logic, for intuitionistic logic, and for multiplicativeadditive linear logic. The specifications of these restrictions are contained in separate small logic definition documents. -The kernel implementation of LKU actually adds another premise to every inference rule: in particular, the asynchronous rules get a premise involving a clerk predicate that simply manages some bookkeeping computations while the synchronous rules get a premise involving an expert predicate that extract information from the certificate to provide to the inference rule. A proof certificate definition is a document that defines these two kinds of predicates. -A proof certificate is a document consisting of the structured object containing the proof evidence supporting theoremhood for a particular formula.
To illustrate this architecture, we present a number of different proof certificate formats. For example, a certificate for resolution refutations can be taken as a list of clauses (including those arising from the original theorem and those added during resolutions) and a list of triples that describes which two clauses resolve to yield a third clause. Such an object should be easy to produce for any theorem prover that uses binary resolution (with implicit factoring). By then adding to the kernel the logic definition for classical logic (given in [13] ) and the definitions of the clerk and expert predicates (given in Section 4.3), resolution refutations can be checked. The exact same kernel (this time restricted to intuitionistic logic) can be used to check natural deduction proofs (i.e., simply and dependently typed λ-terms): all that needs to be changed is the definition of the clerk and expert predicate definitions.
Before presenting specific examples of proof certificate definitions for firstorder classical logic in Section 4, we describe focused proof systems in the next section and, in Section 3, we describe how we have augmented and implemented that proof system within logic programming. The current implementation of our proof checking system is available at https://team.inria.fr/parsifal/proofcert/.
Proof theory architecture
The sequent calculus of Gentzen [8] (which we assume is familiar to the reader) is an appealing setting for starting a discussion of proof certificates. First of all, sequent calculus is well studied and applicable to a wide range of logics. The introduction rules, structural rules (weakening and contraction), and the identity rules (initial and cut) provide a convincing collection of "atoms" of inference. Additionally, cut-elimination theorems are deep results about sequent calculus proof systems that not only prove them to be consistent but also offers cut-free proofs as a normal form for proof. Girard's invention of linear logic [9] provides additional extensions to our understanding of the sequent calculus, including such notions as additive and multiplicative connectives, exponentials, and polarities. Finally, this foundation of Gentzen and Girard lifts naturally and modularly to higher-order logic and to inductive and coinductive fixed points (such as Baelde's µMALL [3] ). In this paper, we shall concentrate on first-order (and propositional) logic: we leave the development of proof certificates for higherorder quantification and fixed points for later work.
The sequent calculus has a serious downside, however: its proofs are far too unstructured to directly support almost any application to computer science. What one needs is a flexible way to organize the "atoms of inference" into much larger and rigid "molecules of inference." The hope would be, of course, that these larger inference rules can be structured to mimic the notion of proof found in many computational logic systems. For example, early work on the proof theoretic foundations of logic programming [16] showed how sequent calculus proofs representing logic programming executions could be built using two alternating phases: the backchaining phase was a focused application of left-rules and the goal-reduction phase was described as a collection of right-rules. Andreoli [1] generalized that earlier work by introducing focused proofs and gave a focused proof system for full linear logic. Later, Liang & Miller presented the LKF and LJF focused proof systems for classical and intuitionistic logic [12] and later the LKU proof system [13] that unified LKF, LJF, and MALLF (a focused proof system for multiplicative-additive linear logic).
While the full kernel of our foundational approach to proof certificates is based on LKU, we shall illustrate our approach by considering the simpler LKF subsystem of LKU. This proof system is given in Figure 1 : more precisely, an augmented version of LKF, called LKF a , is displayed there. The LKF proof system can be recovered from the augmented system by removing all occurrences of the syntactic variable Ξ and by removing all premises with a subscripted e or c as well as replacing all occurrences of tuples such as l, B with just B (the LKF proof system appears in Figure 6 in the appendix). 1 We motive below the (non-augmented version of) LKF (the full, augmented version will be described in Section 3.2). Note that when we describe an inference rule, we read it as an action on sequents that transforms its conclusion into its premises.
Additive vs multiplicative rules. We shall use t, f , ∧, ∨, ∀, and ∃ as the logical connectives of first-order classical logic and sequents will be one-sided. As is familiar to those working with the sequent calculus, there is a choice to make between using the additive and multiplicative versions of the binary connective ∧ and ∨ (and their units t and f , respectively): the most striking difference
Here, P is a positive formula; N a negative formula; Pa a positive literal; C a positive formula or negative literal. In the cut rule, the expression ¬B is the negation of B (defined on connectives as the usual first-order classical negation with polarity flip, on literals as a single polarity flip). between these two versions is illustrated with ∨:
These two inference rules are inter-admissible in the presence of contraction and weakening. For this reason, one usually selects one of these inference rules and discards the other one. In isolation, however, these inference rules are strikingly different: the multiplicative version is invertible while the additive version reveals that one disjunct is not needed at this point of the proof. The LKF proof system will contain the additive and multiplicative versions of disjunction, conjunction, truth, and false: their presence will improve our flexibility for describing proofs.
Polarized connectives. We polarize the propositional connectives as follows: those inference rules that are invertible introduce the negative version of the connective while those inference rules that are not necessarily invertible introduce the positive version of the connective. Thus the additive rule above for the disjunction introduces ∨ + while the multiplicative rule introduces ∨ − . The universal quantifier is obviously polarized negatively while the existential quantifier is polarized positively. Literals must also be polarized: these can be polarized in an arbitrary fashion as long as complementing a literal also flips its polarity. We say that a non-literal formula is positive or negative depending only on the polarity of its top-level connective.
Phases organize groups of inference rules. Sequents are either of the form Θ⇑Γ or Θ ⇓ B where Θ is a multiset of formulas, Γ is a list of formulas, and B is a formula. Introduction rules are applied to either the first element of the list Γ in the ⇑ sequent or the formula B in the ⇓ sequent. This occurrence of the formula B is called the focus of that sequent. Proofs in LKF are built using two kinds of alternating phases. The asynchronous phase is composed of invertible inference rules and only involves ⇑-sequents in the conclusion and premise. The other kind of phase is the synchronous phase: here, rule applications of such inference rules often require choices. In particular, the introduction rule for the disjunction requires selecting either the left or right disjunct and the introduction rule for the existential quantifier requires selecting a term for instantiating the quantifier. The initial rule can terminate a synchronous phase and the cut rule can restart an asynchronous phase. Finally, there are three structural rules in LKF. The store rule recognizes that the first formula to the right of the ⇑ is either a negative atom or a positive formula: such a formula does not have an invertible inference rule and, hence, its treatment is delayed by storing it on the left. The release rule is used when the formula under focus (i.e., the formula to the right of the ⇓) is no longer positive: at such a moment, the phase changes to the asynchronous phase. Finally, the decide rule is used at the end of the asynchronous phase to start a synchronous phase by selecting a previously stored positive formula as the new focus.
Let B be a first-order formula and letB result from B by placing either + or − on occurrences of t, f , ∧, and ∨ (there are exponentially many such placements). It is proved in [12] that B is a theorem if and only if · ⇑B has an LKF proof. Thus the different polarizations do not change provability but can radically change the structure of proofs. Let Ξ be an LKF proof of · ⇑ B for some (polarized) formula B. A simple induction reveals that every occurrence of Θ ⇓ D and of Θ ⇑ Γ in Ξ is such that Θ contains only negative literals or positive formulas. Also, it is immediate that the only occurrence of a contraction rule is within the decide rule: thus, only the positive formulas are contracted. Since there is flexibility in how formulas are polarized, the choice of polarization can, at times, lead to greatly reduced opportunities for contraction. When one is able to eliminate or constrain contractions, naive proof search can sometimes become a decision procedure.
Software architecture
Of the many qualities that we might want for a proof checker-universality, flexibility, efficiency-the one quality on which no compromise is possible is that of soundness. If we cannot prove or forcefully argue for the soundness of our checkers, then this project is without its reason d'être.
Programming language support
An early framework for building sound proof checkers was the "Logic of Computable Functions" (LCF) system of Gordon, Milner, and Wadsworth [10] . In
:-memb(P, Θ), pos(P ), sync(Θ, P ).
∀Θ∀B∀C. async(Θ, [])
:-negate(B, C), async(Θ, B), async(Θ, C).
Fig. 2. Five logic programming clauses specifying LKF inference rules
that framework, the ML programming language was created in order to support the task of building and checking proofs in LCF with a computing facility that provided strong typing and the abstractions associated to higher-order programming and abstract datatypes. Given the design of ML, it was possible to declare a type of theorems, say, thm, and to admit certain functions that are allowed to build elements of type thm (these encode axioms and inference rules). These latter functions could then be bundled into an abstract datatype and the programming language would enforce that the only items that eventually were shown to have type thm were those that ultimately were constructed from the axioms and inference rules encoded into the theorem abstract datatype. Of course, trusting that a checker written in this approach to LCF meant also trusting that (1) ML had the type preservation property and (2) the language implementation was, in fact, correct for the intended semantics (i.e., that the addition function translated to the intended addition function, etc.). The material in Section 2 illustrates that there can be a great deal more to the structure of proof than is apparent when one views proofs as the application of inference rules to axioms. We are fortunate that in order to take advantage of that rich structure, we do not need to invent a meta-language (in the sense that ML was invented to support LCF): an appropriate meta-language already exists in the λProlog programming language [15] . In contrast to the functional programming language ML, λProlog is a logic programming language. Like ML, λProlog is also strongly typed and has both higher-order programming and abstract datatypes. λProlog has a number of things in its favor over ML that should prove their value in proof checking. In particular, λProlog's operational semantics is based on search and backtracking: this is in contrast to the notion of exception handling that is part of the non-functional side of ML. Furthermore, λProlog comes with much more of logic built into the language: in particular, it contains a logically sound notion of unification and substitution for expressions involving bindings.
Although we shall not assume that the reader is familiar with λProlog, familiarity with the general notions of logic programming is particularly relevant to proof checking. Notice that it is nearly immediate to write a logic program that captures the LKF proof system in Figure 6 . First select two binary predicates, say async(·, ·) and sync(·, ·), denoting the ⇑ and ⇓ judgments. Second write one Horn clause for each inference rule: here the conclusion and the premises of a rule correspond to the head and the body of such a clause. (The declarative treatment of the inference rules involving the quantifiers is provided directly by λProlog.) Of the fourteen Horn clauses that correspond to the fourteen inference rules in Figure 6 , five are illustrated in Figure 2 : these clauses correspond to the introduction rules for t − , ∧ − , and ∨ + as well as the decide and cut rules. Some additional predicates have been introduced to specify membership in a multiset, the negation of a formula, and determining if a given formula is positive or not.
The full program can easily be seen to be sound in the sense that the sequent · ⇑ B has an LKF proof if the atom async([], B) has a proof using this logic program. Using standard depth-first search strategies would result, however, in surprisingly few proofs of the atom async([], B): the clauses specifying the cut rule and the decide rule would immediately result in looping computations. We present this logic program not to suggest that it is appropriate for proving theorems but to show how to modify it to make it into a flexible proof checker.
Clerks and experts
Consider being in possession of a proof (in some format) of a theorem and being asked to build an LKF proof of that theorem. The construction of the asynchronous phase is independent of any proof evidence you have (hence the name "asynchronous" for this phase). At the end of the asynchronous phase, the construction of the LKF proof can proceed with either the cut rule or the decide rule: in both cases, genuine information (a cut formula or a focus formula) must be communicated to the checker. Furthermore, the synchronous phase needs to determine which disjunct to discard in the ∨ + rule and which term to use in the ∃ rule. We can now describe the augmentations to the LKF inference rules: in particular, every inference rule of LKF is also given an additional premise using either an expert predicate or a clerk predicate.
The expert predicates are used to intermediate between the needs of the cut rule and the synchronous phase for information and the information that is present in a proof certificate: for example, the disjunction expert ∨ e (Ξ, Ξ , i) examines the certificate Ξ and returns either 1 or 2 depending on which disjunct this introduction rule should select. Similarly, the intension of the existential quantifier expert ∃ e (Ξ, Ξ , t) is that it examines the certificate Ξ and returns a term t that is to be used in this introduction rule. In both of these cases, these predicates also determine the certificate Ξ to be used in the premise. Notice that the conjunction expert does nothing more than determine the proof certificate to be used in its two premises. Finally, the expert for the t + examines the certificate to determine whether or not it should allow the proof checking process to end with this inference rule. Similarly, the cut expert examines both the proof certificate and the context Θ and extracts the necessary cut formula for that inference rule. Notice that if this predicate is defined to always fail (i.e., it is the empty relation), then checking this certificate will involve only cut-free LKF proofs. Finally, the release rule also involves a similar expert predicate.
The introduction rules of the asynchronous phase are given an additional premise that involves a clerk predicate: these new premises do not extract any information from the certificate but rather they take care of bookkeeping calculations involving the progress of the asynchronous phase. For example, the ∧ c (Ξ, Ξ 1 , Ξ 2 ) judgment can be used to record in Ξ 1 the fact that proof checking is on the left branch of this conjunction as opposed to the right branch.
One of the strengths of our approach to proof certificates is that experts can be non-deterministic since this allows a trade-off between the size of a certificate and proof-reconstruction time. For example, let Ξ be a particular certificate and consider using it to introduce an existential quantifier. This introduction rule queries the expert ∃ e (Ξ, Ξ , t). If the Ξ certificate explicitly contains the term t, the expert can extract it for use in this inference rules. If the certificate does not contain this term then the judgment ∃ e (Ξ, Ξ , t) could succeed for every term t (and for some Ξ ). In this case, the expert provides no information as to which substitution term to use and, therefore, the certificate can be smaller since it does need to contain the (potentially large) term t. On the other hand, the checker will need to reconstruct an appropriate such term during the checking process (using, for example, the underlying logic programming mechanism of unification). While experts are queried during the synchronous phase, their answers may be specific, partial, or completely unconstrained.
The three remaining rules (store, init, decide) of LKF a reveal the structure of the collection of formulas we have been designating with the syntactic variable Θ. In our presentation of the LKF proof system, this structure has been taken to be a multiset of formulas. In our augmented proof system, we shall take this sequent context to be a set of pairs I, C where C is a formula and I is an index. When we need to refer to a specific occurrence of a formula in Θ (in, say, the decide rule), an index is used for this purpose. It is the clerk predicate associated to the store inference rule that is responsible for computing the index of the formula when it is moved from the right to the left of the ⇑. When the expert predicate in the decide rule describes the formula on which to focus, it does so by returning that formula's index. Finally, the initial expert determines which stored negative literal should be the complement of the focused literal. In the augmented form of both the decide and initial rules, additional premises have been added to check that the labels returned by the expert predicates are, indeed, labels for the correct kind of formula: in this way, a badly defined expert cannot lead to the construction of an illegal LKF proof.
The structure of the indexing scheme is left open for the certificate definition to describe. As we shall illustrate later, indexes can be based on, for example, de Bruijn numbers, path addresses within a formula, or on formulas themselves. It is possible for a formula to occur twice in the context Θ with two different labels. We shall generally assume, however, that the labels functionally determine formulas: if l, C 1 ∈ Θ and l, C 2 ∈ Θ then C 1 and C 2 are equal.
Assume that we have a logic programming system that provides a sound implementation of Horn clauses (for example, unification contains the occurcheck). A proof of Ξ ·⇑B within a logic programming implementation of LKF a (along with the programs defining the experts and clerks) immediately yields an LKF proof of · ⇑ B. This follows easily since the logic programming proof of this goal can be mapped to an LKF proof directly: the only subtlety being that the mapping from indexes to formulas must be functional so that the indexes returned by the decide and initial rules are given a unique interpretation in the LKF proof. Notice that no such LKF proof is actually constructed: rather, it is performed. Notice also that this soundness guarantee holds with no restrictions placed on the implementation of the clerk and expert predicates.
Defining a proof certification format
The definition of a proof certificate format begins with the declaration of the constructors of the types cert and index (for certificates and indexes, respectively). We are assuming that the underlying logic programming language is typed (as is the case with λProlog). Following those declarations is the logic program defining the clerk predicates f c (·, ·), ∨ c (·, ·), ∧ c (·, ·, ·), ∀ c (·, ·), and store c (·, ·, ·, ·) and the expert predicates t e (·), ∧ e (·, ·, ·), ∨ e (·, ·, ·), ∃ e (·, ·, ·), init e (·, ·,), cut e (·, ·, ·, ·, ·), release e (·, ·), and decide e (·, ·, ·, ·). Writing no specification for a given predicate defines that predicate to hold for no list of arguments. Figures 3, 4 , and 5 are examples of such proof certificate definitions.
Some certificate definitions for classical logic
We now present some proof certificate formats for classical logic. The first step in making such a definition is to choose a polarization of the logical connectives and atomic formulas. Our first two examples of proof certificates are based on assigning negative polarizations to all atoms and to all connectives: i.e., we only use ∧ − , ∨ − , t − , and f − . A useful measurement of an LKF proof is its decide depth, i.e., the maximum number of instances of the decide rule along any path from the proof's root to one of its leaves.
A decision procedure
There is a simple decision procedure for checking whether or not a classical propositional formula is a tautology and we can design a proof certificate definition that implements such a decision procedure. This example of a certificate format illustrates an extreme trade-off between certificate size (here, constantsize) and proof reconstruction time (exponential time). In particular, notice that there is an LKF proof of a propositional formula if and only if that proof has decide depth 1 (possibly 0 if the formula contains no literals). The structure of an LKF proof of a tautology first builds the asynchronous phase, which ends with several premises all of the form L ⇑ · for some multiset of literals L. Such a sequent is provable if and only if L has complementary literals: in that case, the LKF proof is composed of a decide rule (selecting a positive literal) and initial (matching that atom with a negative literal).
A proof certificate format associated to this decision procedure is given in Figure 3 . A single constant is used for the certificate and formulas are used to unit : cert idx : form -> index fc (unit, unit) .
∧c(unit, unit, unit).
∀C. storec(unit, C, unit, idx(C)). ∨c(unit, unit).
∀Θ∀l. decidee(unit, Θ, unit, l). releasee(unit, unit).
∀Θ∀l∀N. inite(unit, Θ, l). Fig. 3 . A checker based on a simple decision procedure denote indexes (thereby trivializing the notion of indexes) so we need a constructor to coerce formulas into indexes. Figure 3 also contains the specifications of the clerk and expert predicates. Notice that, for example, the initial expert does nothing particularly expert here in the sense that it relates the unit certificate to all labels l and all contexts Θ. Our definition of this predicate here can be unconstrained since the label that it returns is not trusted: that is, the initial rule in LKF a will check that l is the label of the complement of the focus formula. In the usual logic-programming-sense, the check in the premise is all that is necessary to select the correct label. A similar statement is true of the decide expert predicate definition.
Matings
Let B be a classical propositional formula in negation normal form. In [2] Andrews defined a mating M for B as a set of pairs of literal occurrences in B. A mating denotes a proof if every vertical path in B (read: clause in the conjunctive normal form of B) contains a pair of literal occurrences given by set M. A certificate checker for proof matings is given in Figure 4 via the declaration of constructors for cert and index and via the definitions of clerk and expert predicates. Indexes are, in fact, paths in a formula since they form a series of instructions to move left or right through the binary connectives or to stop (presumably at a literal). There are two constructors for the cert type: aphase is applied to a list of indexes and sphase is applied to a single index. These two constructors are used to mimic (using paths) the development the LKF asynchronous and synchronous sequents (using formulas). The initial expert will only select index l if it is M-mated to the focused formula (with path address k). Here, we have assumed that M contains ordered pairs of occurrences in which the first occurrence names a positive literal and the second occurrence names a negative literal. Thus, in order to determine if M is a proof mating for the formula B, setB to be the polarization of B using only negative connectives and check if the goal formula async(unit, [],B) succeeds from the logic program composed of the augmented LKF system, the clerk and expert predicate definitions above, and an encoding of the k, l ∈ M predicate.
Resolution refutations
A (resolution) clause is a closed formula that is the universal closure of a disjunction of literals (the empty disjunction is false). When we polarize, we use the ∀I. releasee(sphase(I), aphase([I]) ). negative versions of these connectives. We assume that a certificate for resolution contains the following items: a list of all clauses C 1 , . . . , C p (p ≥ 0); the number n ≥ 0 which selects the last clause that is part of the original problem (i.e., this certificate is claiming that ¬C 1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬C n is provable and that C n+1 ...C p are intermediate clauses used to derive the empty one); and a list of triples i, j, k where each such triple claims that C k is a binary resolution (with factoring) of C i and C j . If the implementer of a resolution prover wished to output refutations, this kind of document should be easy to accommodate.
Checking this structure is done in two steps. First, we check that a particular binary resolution is sound and then we check that the list of resolvents leads to an empty clause. It is a simple matter to prove the following: if clauses C 1 and C 2 yield resolvent C 0 as a binary resolvent (allowing also factoring), then the focused sequent ¬C 1 , ¬C 2 ⇑ C 0 has a proof of decide depth 3 or less. We can also restrict such a proof so that along any path from the root sequent to its leaves, the same clause is not decided on more than once. The first part of Figure 5 contains the ingredients of a checker for the claim ¬C 1 , ¬C 2 ⇑ C 0 . This checking uses two constructors for indexes: the first is used to reference clauses (i.e., the expression (idx i) denotes ¬C i ) and the second constructor is used to index literals that need to be stored: here the literal is used to provide its own index. The first two cert constructors in that figure are used to control the sequencing of decide rules involving two (negated) clauses. The first of these constructors provides the sequent of clause indexes (at most 2) used to build a proof and the second constructor is used to signal that the proof should finish with the selection of stored literals and not with additional clauses.
The clerks for this part of the checking process do essentially no computation and just move certificates around unchanged: the exception is the store clerk that provides the trivial index (lit C) for the literal C. The only expert that provides information to guide proof reconstruction is the decide expert which transforms the choice of clauses to consider from two to one to none. Given these clerks and experts, it is now the case that if C i and C j resolve to yield C k then the following judgment is provable:
rdone : cert rlist : list (int * int * int) -> cert rlisti : int -> list (int * int * int) -> cert ∀R. fc(rlist(R), rlist(R)).
∀C∀l∀R. storec(rlisti(l, R), C, rlist(R), l).
Fig. 5. Resolution certificate checker in two parts
With only small changes, the binary resolution checker can be extended to hyperresolution: in this case, the experts will need to attempt to find a proof of decide depth n + 1 when attempting to resolve together n ≥ 2 clauses.
To describe a checker for a complete certificate, we need three additional constructors for certificates as well as the additional clauses in the second part of Figure 5 . Notice that the decide expert only proposes a focus at the end of the checking process when the list of triples (resolvents) is empty: this expert only succeeds if one of the clauses is t (the negation of the empty clause). It is the cut expert that is responsible for looping over all the triples encoding resolvents. Notice that the cut-formula is the clause C k and that the left premise invokes the resolvent checking mechanism described above. The right premise of the cut carries with it an index (in this case, k) so that the next step in the proof checking, namely store, knows which index to use to correctly store that formula. The LKF proof that is implicitly built during the checking of a resolution contains one cut rule for every resolvent triple in the certificate.
Capturing general computation within proofs
The line between computation and deduction is certainly movable and one that a flexibly designed proof certificate format should allow to be moved. As we saw in Section 4.1, we can use naive proof reconstruction to compute, for example, the conjunctive normal form of a propositional formula. We can go further, however, and allow for arbitrary Horn clause programs to be computed on firstorder terms during proof reconstruction. For example, if one needs to check a proof rule that involves a premise that requires one number to divide another number, it is an easy matter to write a (pure) Prolog program that computes this binary relationship on numbers. Such Horn clauses can be added to the sequent context and a proof certificate could easily guide the construction of a proof of that premise from such clauses.
Adequacy of encoding
Our use of the augmented LKF proof system as our kernel guarantees soundness no matter how the clerk and expert predicates are defined. On the other hand, one might want to know if the checker is really checking the proof intended in the certificate. A checker for a mating could, in fact, ignore the mating and run the decision procedure from Section 4.1 instead. The kernel itself cannot guarantee the adequacy of the checking: knowledge of the certificate definition is necessary to ensure that. As our examples show, however, the semantics of the clerk and expert predicates is clearly given by the LKF a proof system and certificate definitions are compact: thus, verifying certificates should be straightforward.
Some aspects of a proof certificate (beyond their soundness) are not always possible to check using our kernel. Consider defining a minimal proof mating to be a proof mating for which no mated pairs can be removed and still remain a proof mating. We see no way to capture this minimality condition: that is, we see no way to write a certificate definition that successfully approves a mating if and only if it is a minimal proof mating. A similar observation can be made with resolution: if ¬C 1 , ¬C 2 ⇑ C 0 has a proof (even a proof of decide depth 3) it is not necessarily the case that C 0 is the resolvent of C 1 and C 2 . For example, the resolution of
At the same time, it is possible to prove the sequent
This formula is similar to a resolvent except it uses a unifier that is not most general and it has an additional literal. Thus, when the resolution proof certificate checker succeeds, what is checked is its soundness and not its technical status of being a resolvent.
The more general kernel
As we have mentioned, a more general kernel for proof checking is based not on LKF but the LKU proof system of [13] . Instead of the two polarities in LKF, there are four polarities in LKU: the polarities −1 and +1 denote positive and negative polarities of linear logic while the polarities −2 and +2 denote the positive and negative polarities of classical logic. Intuitionistic logic use formulas that have subformulas of all four polarities. In order to restrict the LKU proof system to emulate, say, LKF, LJF, or MALLF, one simply needs to describe certain restrictions to the structural rules (store, decide, release, and init) of LKU. The logic definition documents (see Section 1) declare these restrictions.
The LKU proof system makes it possible to use the vocabulary for structuring checkers in LKF (clerks, experts, store, decide, release) to also design checkers in the intuitionistic focused framework LJF. The main subtleties with using LKU is that we must deal with a linear logic context: since such contexts must be split into two contexts occasionally, some of the expert predicates need to describe which splitting is required. We have defined certificate formats for simple and dependently typed λ-calculus: that is, the LKU kernel can check natural deduction proofs in propositional and first-order intuitionistic logic (de Bruijn numerals make a natural index for store/decide).
Related and future work
Getting theorem provers to share and cooperate is being addressed by a number of researchers in recent years. For example, the OpenTheory project [11] aims at having various HOL theorem provers share proofs. Still other projects attempt to connect SAT/SMTP systems with more general theorem provers, e.g., [5, 7] .
The Dedukti proof checker [4] implements λΠ modulo, a dependently typed λ-calculus with functional rewriting. Given a result of Cousineau & Dowek [6] that any functional Pure Type System can be encoded into λΠ modulo, Dedukti can check proofs in such type systems. As we have described above, the proof certificate setting described here allows one to capture both dependently typed λ-terms and computations (not just functional computations). As a result, we should be able to design, following [6] , proof certificates for pure type systems. The dependently typed λ-calculus LF has recently been extended to LFSC to allow computations within inference rules in order to accommodate side-conditions [17] . Such proof objects should similarly be captured in our setting.
Getting provers to trust each other's proofs using the techniques described in this paper will require the development and acceptance of an infrastructure and associated tools, something that can clearly take time. One area where proof certificates can make an early impact is in theorem proving competitions. In such competitions, theorem provers should not be trusted but rather proof certificates that they emit should be checked. In that case, our foundational proof certificates can provide a clear semantics for what constitutes a proof certificate.
Besides the proof certificates formats that we have described above, we have designed other examples as well (including, Hilbert style proofs and proof nets for multiplicative linear logic). We plan to develop still more proof certificates within this setting. This work on foundational proof certificates is part of a more ambitious project to design proof certificates that also allow for fixed point definitions (including induction and coinduction): such certificates should be able to allow model checkers and inductive theorem provers to communicate with each other. Other extensions involve incorporating higher-order quantification and to eventually also allow counterexamples to be checked and to interact with (partial) proofs [14] .
Conclusion
In a world where proof certificates can be designed flexibly and given precise semantics and where proof checkers can be given a high degree of trust, the sharing of proofs should become "feature zero" for all new theorem provers. That is, implementers looking to get their provers accepted broadly will need to first consider how to communicate their proof evidence as a checkable certificate. In such a world, proofs can be liberated from the technologies that produced them (e.g., Coq, Isabelle, and Mizar) and can be seen as the universal and eternal objects logicians and proof theorist have long been working to place at the foundations of mathematics and computer science.
